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Saying “Yes”: How California’s Affirmative
Consent Policy Can Transform Rape Culture
Ruby Aliment*
[I]f there is one area of social behavior where sexism is entrenched
in law—one realm where traditional male prerogatives are most
protected, male power most jealously preserved, and female power
most jealously limited—it is in the area of sex itself, even forced
sex.1
—Susan Estrich, 1991

I. INTRODUCTION
Many criticize the recent spotlight on campus sexual assault rates as
another example of the feminist movement emphasizing white feminist
issues at the expense of more pervasive and wide-reaching problems.2 But
this criticism fails to recognize that the focus on college sexual assault
*

J.D. candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2016; B.A., University of Puget
Sound, 2012.
Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 814–15 (1991).
2
Batya Ungar-Sargon, In 2014, the Campus Rape Debate Drowned Out More
Important Feminist Issues, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Dec. 30, 2014),
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/120660/campus-rape-panic-why-feminists-chosewrong-issue-2014; see also Susan Dwyer, What a difference ‘yes’ makes for sex, AL
JAZEERA AMERICA (Jan. 6, 2015), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/1/campussexual-assaultaffirmativeconsent.html. “In addition, affirmative consent is confined to
institutions controlled by the U.S. Education Amendments’ Title IX, which protects
people in educational programs that receive federal funding against discrimination on the
basis of gender. For this reason, some suggest it may be an elitist standard that does
nothing to protect women who are not in college.” Id.; see also Jon K. Brent, Lawmakers
tackle sexual violence starting in high school, KION NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015),
http://www.kionrightnow.com/news/local-news/lawmakers-tackle-sexual-violencestarting-in-high-school/31706626 (“The new legislation would also require high school
Health classes to discuss how to develop healthy relationships and include information
about affirmative consent.”).
1
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impacts the education of consent throughout the American public education
system, and the resulting pressure can lead to the adoption of better
policies. 3 The reformation of sexual misconduct policies on college
campuses could transform our cultural attitudes towards consent, and an
emphasis on education rather than incarceration presents an alternative
method for increasing the safety of all individuals affected by sexual
violence.
Social science research estimates that one-in-four to one-in-five women
will experience an attempted or completed sexual assault while in college.4
Universities are known for their inaction or sub-par response to allegations
of sexual assault and issues of non-consent, due in large part to the sheer
number of alleged assaults that occur on them. 5 In response, the federal
government, through the Office of Civil Rights, published policy guidelines
on Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 expressing its intent that
Title IX cover sexual harassment and sexual assault. 6 Despite these
explanations, 76 schools are currently under investigation for violating Title
IX in the enforcement of their sexual assault and misconduct policies.7
3

See Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §1681(a)
(1972) (any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance).
4
CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, THE CAMPUS
SEXUAL ASSAULT (CSA) STUDY xii (2007), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf.
5
See Caroline Heldman, The Second Wave of Backlash Against Anti-Rape Activism,
MS. MAGAZINE (Aug. 19, 2014), http://msmagazine.com/blog/2014/08/19/the-secondwave-of-backlash-against-anti-rape-activism/.
6
Grayson Sang Walker, The Evolution and Limits of Title IX Doctrine on Peer Sexual
Assault, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 102 (2010); see also U.S. Dep’t of Educ.’s
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), Title IX and Sex Discrimination, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.
(Apr. 29, 2015), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html.
7
Tyler Kingkade, 85 Colleges Are Now Under Federal Investigation for Sexual Assault
Cases, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/10/15/colleges-federal-investigation-sexualassault_n_5990286.html; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Educ.’s Office for Civil
Rights (OCR), U.S. Dep’t of Educ. Releases List of Higher Educ. Inst. with Open Title
IX Sexual Violence Investigations (May 1, 2014), available at
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This article argues that Title IX should go further in protecting students’
equal access to education and safety by mandating affirmative consent
standards in the investigation of allegations. It should also mandate other
survivor-centered policies that focus on education and bystander awareness.
In this article, California's Senate Bill 967, often referred to as the "Yes
Means Yes" Bill, is used as a case study to argue that the federal mandate of
an affirmative consent policy, among other survivor-centered programming,
is necessary to address the campus rape epidemic. An affirmative consent
policy is a vital step in ameliorating the negative implications of contract
theory and sexism in our cultural attitudes and legal standards towards
sexual consent and female autonomy.8
This paper begins with a brief history of consent, contract theory, and
American rape law. Second, it describes the federal government’s attempts
to address the problem. Third, it describes how universities respond, or fail
to respond, to allegations of sexual assault in light of federal legislation.
Fourth, I argue that California’s response is appropriately tailored to address
non-consent on college campuses. Fifth, I argue that federal enforcement of
a national policy is the best solution for making a difference. Finally, I
illustrate how implementing an affirmative consent standard into preexisting Title IX requirements, specifically the lower standard of proof, will
not infringe on the due process rights of the accused and presents the fairest
method to adjudicate these allegations.

http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-highereducation-institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations.
8
This paper advocates for a change to Title IX, but specifically analyzes the change’s
impact on institutions of higher education. Additionally, some academics have compared
changing the policy around consent to laws mandating that people wear seatbelts, which
suggests that policy can impact behavior and change our cultural attitudes. See Michael
Catalini, More States Weigh a ‘Yes Means Yes’ College Policy, VNEWS.COM (Nov. 25,
2014), http://www.vnews.com/news/state/region/14513534-95/more-states-weigh-a-yesmeans-yes-college-policy.
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A. Use of Language
Although women are the primary victims of sexual violence,9 people still
criticize the feminist movement for over-victimizing women10 In discussing
the campus rape epidemic, any attempt to de-gender the conversation would
be misleading, as college women experience sexual assault at much higher
rates than men, and most often at the hands of men11 The heteronormativity
implicated by the campus rape epidemic has two points of significance:
first, it illustrates the gendered dynamic of consent (where women’s consent
is suspect under the law, privileging men’s sexuality and power), and
second, it shows how our gendered assumptions result in a failure to
properly address and find solutions for sexual assault by stereotyping male
and female sexual behavior in campus adjudicatory hearings (e.g., the
common narratives that boys will be boys and she asked for it).
Therefore, throughout this paper, I use female gender pronouns to refer to
individuals making sexual assault accusations and male gender pronouns for
those accused of sexual assault. I recognize that women often perpetrate
sexual assault against men, but, in most cases, college men are raped by
other men. 12 Furthermore, since so few men report, there is very little
9

KREBS ET AL, supra note 4, at viii; see also Victims and Perpetrators, NAT’L INST. OF
JUST. (Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/rape-sexualviolence/Pages/victims-perpetrators.aspx.
10
Cathy Young, Stop Fem-Splaining: What ‘Women Against Feminism’ Gets Right,
TIME MAGAZINE (July 24, 2014), http://time.com/3028827/women-against-feminismgets-it-right/.
11
Victims and Perpetrators, supra note 9; RANA SAMPSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE:
OFFICE OF CMTY. ORIENTED POLICING SERV., ACQUAINTANCE RAPE OF COLLEGE
STUDENTS 3 (2002), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/e03021472.pdf (“Ninety
percent of college women who are victims of rape or attempted rape know their assailant.
The attacker is usually a classmate, friend, boyfriend, ex-boyfriend, or other acquaintance
(in that order).”).
12
See id. “College men who are raped are usually raped by other men. However, since
so few men report, information is limited about the extent of the problem.” Id. National
criminal justice statistics reveal that of all adults/juveniles who come to the attention of
authorities for sex crimes, females account for less than 10% of the cases. See also
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reliable information available to describe the problem.13 This paper relies on
available information, and therefore, de-gendering the accused and accuser
would not adequately describe the statistics or responses to those statistics.
Next, the victim versus survivor distinction is unquestionably political.14
The linguistic shift from victim to survivor, in many ways, better describes
the experience of those who have experienced sexual assault by challenging
the victimization of women and recognizing the strength required for many
to live after a sexual assault. Therefore, those accused of sexual assault will
be referred to as the perpetrator, the accused, or the alleged rapist
(depending on the determination of the accusation), and the accuser will be
referred to as the complainant or survivor, unless specific information
indicates how a particular individual describes herself following a sexual
assault.
Finally, I use the terms “rape” and “sexual assault” interchangeably to
refer to nonconsensual sexual contact and intercourse.15
CENTER FOR SEX OFFENDER MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FEMALE SEX
OFFENDERS 1 (2007), available at
http://www.csom.org/pubs/female_sex_offenders_brief.pdf.
13
Id.
14
E.g., Hannah Groch-Begley, A Guide To George Will’s Decades Of Attacks On Sexual
Assault Victims & “Rape Crisis Feminists,” MEDIA MATTERS FOR AM. (Oct. 15, 2014),
http://mediamatters.org/research/2014/10/15/a-guide-to-george-wills-decades-of-attackson-s/201166 (A prominent American journalist and author criticized “what he called the
‘victimization sweepstakes,’ in which ‘many prizes, including media attention and
therapeutic preferences from government, go to those who succeed at being seen as
vulnerable and suffering,’ specifically for experiencing rape on college campuses.”).
15
Side note: I do not address the fear of false rape reports because no reliable data exists
to suggest that false rape reports occur at any level higher than the false reports of other
crimes, such as burglary and homicide. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reports
that unfounded rape reports account for eight percent of total reported rapes; however,
this number fails to control for the various conditions that encourage individuals to
rescind their accusations, such as a person’s intimate relationship with the accused, the
lack of physical evidence, victim blaming, and police bias. Additionally, new research
has shown that many of these statistics mischaracterized unfounded charges as false
reports when they really described those cases for which the police declined to
recommend prosecution. See SAMPSON, supra note 11, at 5; see also Nicholas J. Little,
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II. CONSENT, CONTRACT THEORY, AND RAPE LAW
Why do you consult their words when it is not their mouths that
speak? . . . The lips always say “no,” and rightly so; but the tone is
not always the same, and that cannot lie. . . . Must her
modesty condemn her to misery? 16
—Jean-Jacque Rousseau, 1911
The above quote from Rousseau describes his personal misogynistic
attitudes towards female sexual autonomy, in addition to a commonplace
romantic ideal whereby notions of modesty encourage women to play hard
to get.17 John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, two other great political theorists,
shared similar positions on female consent and romance, and all three are
credited, in large part, with the foundation of much of American (referring
to the United States of America) political thought. 18 In summarizing the
development of American political thought, Mustafa T. Kasubhai wrote, “If
this is the type of consent society has accorded women throughout history,
it is not surprising that rape law has developed requiring resistance and
force, rather than actual non-consent of the victim.”19 These trends inform

From No Means No to Only Yes Means Yes: The Rational Results of an Affirmative
Consent Standard in Rape Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1321, 1330–31 (2005). “Those who
suggest that women are prone to false accusations of rape, and who thus oppose any
liberalization of the requirements to establish a case of rape, have failed to demonstrate
why the numbers do not bear out such a suggestion. They also have not shown why
women might be more prone to invent charges of rape then men might be to unjustly
accuse people of other crimes (which do not carry the same evidentiary requirements)
. . .What is also well documented is the fact that false accusations of rape are no more
prevalent than false accusations of other types of major crime.” Id.; see also Beverly J.
Ross, Does Diversity in Legal Scholarship Make A Difference?: A Look at the Law of
Rape, 100 DICK. L. REV. 795, 812 (1996).
16
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, EMILE, 332 (Barbara Foxley trans., 1911).
17
See Maureen Dowd, What’s a Modern Girl to Do?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Oct. 30, 2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/30/magazine/whats-a-modern-girl-to-do.html?_r=0.
18
See Mustafa T. Kasubhai, Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory in Rape
Law Is Turned on Its Head, 11 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 37, 49 (1996).
19
Id.

SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Saying “Yes”

our understanding of women’s ability to consent, which complicates the
adjudication of rape accusations.
Throughout American legal history, women’s consent has been suspect
and discredited. For example, in Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, decided in
1994, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied recourse to a complainant
after finding that her story was insufficient to establish the “forcible
compulsion” element necessary to support a rape conviction.20 The court
reasoned that because the defendant did not physically restrain the
complainant, except through his body weight, and the complainant never
attempted to leave the room, when “the record clearly demonstrate[d] that
the door could be unlocked easily from the inside,” her testimony was
devoid of any evidence of force, even though she said “no” throughout the
encounter.21 Existing case law dictated that when the record does not show
evidence of physical force or psychological coercion, the forcible
compulsion requirement could not be met.22
Brown v. State, decided in 1906, used similar reasoning. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin reversed the conviction and sentencing of a man
accused of raping a 14-year-old girl.23 The complainant in the case testified
that the defendant approached her in a field on her way to a family
member’s home, tripped her to the ground, removed her clothing, and had
intercourse with her.24 During the act, the complainant screamed as loud as
she could and struggled to get up, but the defendant covered her mouth.25
On these facts, the court found that the complainant’s testimony did not

20
21
22
23
24
25

Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1166 (Pa. 1994).
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Brown v. State, 106 N.W. 536, 541 (Wis. 1906).
Id. at 537.
Id.
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adequately demonstrate that the sexual act was against her will.26 The court
held that
not only must there be an entire absence of mental consent or
assent, but there must be the most vehement exercise of every
physical means or faculty within the woman’s power to resist the
penetration of her person, and this must be shown to persist until
the offense is consummated.27
Given the facts, it is difficult to imagine what the complainant could have
done differently to demonstrate non-consent.
Both cases, though separated by almost 100 years, do not rely on unusual
legal standards. In fact, the American Law Institute’s revision of the Model
Penal Code adopts the attitude that a rape charge should not depend on a
woman’s lack of consent, but on the attacker’s use of force.28
These attitudes towards consent created an uncodified, though frequently
followed, “reasonable victim” standard for evaluating the complainant’s
behavior.29 Many courts require women to display the maximum amount of
resistance, regardless of the evidence that “rape victims who attempt
physical resistance to sexual attacks are significantly more likely to be
injured than those who do not.”30 This standard assumes that all women
who experience sexual violence communicate their non-consent in the same
way—specifically in the way men are expected to communicate it. This
male victim model is
best known to the male judges and lawyers who formulated it, but
not a model appropriate for a class of victims almost entirely
26

Id. at 540–41.
Id. at 538.
28
Kasubhai, supra note 18, at 55–56; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1980). A
definition of rape should focus “upon objective manifestations of aggression by the actor.
Accordingly, the offense is defined to occur when the actor ‘compels’ the victim ‘to
submit by force or by threat.” Id.
29
Ross, supra note 15, at 819.
30
Id. at 817.
27
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female. . . . This is a standard developed by men from the
perspective of men and then imposed on [women] without regard
to whether most women actually conform to the standard. 31
If these assumptions were accurate, our rape laws and attitudes toward
consent would have contributed to the decline of sexual assault.
Our cultural acceptance of utmost resistance as the necessary indicator of
non-consent obscures our understanding of consent and rape, creating a
particularly dangerous environment for women. For example, in a recent
study published by Violence & Gender, researchers found that, when
behaviorally-descriptive questions are posed to heterosexual men (e.g.,
“Have you ever coerced somebody to intercourse by holding them down?”)
versus questions using targeted labels (e.g., “Have you ever raped
somebody?”), men will admit to exercising sexually coercive behaviors,
including using some force to obtain intercourse, but they will deny ever
raping a woman.32
Cynthia Ann Wicktom reports in her paper, Focusing on the Offender’s
Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for the Redefinition of Rape Laws, that rape
law traditionally focused on the survivor’s non-consent to determine
whether rape occurred.33 Therefore, without evidence of forceful conduct
and overt non-consent, silence operates as consent.34 Many people fail to
31

Id. at 819.
Sarah R. Edwards et al., Denying Rape but Endorsing Forceful Intercourse: Exploring
Differences Among Responders, 1 VIOLENCE & GENDER 188, 188–93 (2014), available
at http://online.liebertpub.com/doi/pdf/10.1089/vio.2014.0022.
33
Cynthia Ann Wicktom, Focusing on the Offender’s Forceful Conduct: A Proposal for
the Redefinition of Rape Laws, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 399, 402 (1988).
34
Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981). Under the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, there are two exceptional instances where silence is
interpreted as acceptance: first, those where the offered silently takes the offered benefits,
and second, those where one party has given the other party reason to interpret silence or
inaction as asset, sometimes based on prior dealings between the parties. Critics of
affirmative consent policies say the standard causes sexual interaction to look more like
contractual engagements (i.e., Can I touch you here? Yes. Can I kiss you there? Yes);
however, legal contractual standards parallel American rape law more than California’s
32
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realize that this conceptualization of consent and resistance in rape law is
largely informed by a distinctly male point of view—to the exclusion of the
female experience.35
Our prevailing conception of consent (i.e., no means no), which requires
force and overt non-consent, presumes that both social actors enter into the
sexual contract as equals.
[C]ritics . . . have attacked the claim that, if two individuals make a
contract, the fact that the contract has been made is sufficient to
show that the exchange must be equal. The critics point out that,
[sic] if one party is in an inferior position . . . then he or she has no
choice but to agree to the disadvantageous terms offered by the
superior party.36
Some feminist critics have even gone as far as to say that, within our current
construct of female consent within a patriarchal society, women can never
truly consent to sex.37 Considered radical by some, this position illustrates
the need to seriously consider how women are disadvantaged by the
prevailing consent standards.
In her book Date Rape: Feminism, Philosophy, and The Law, Lois
Pineau writes that “because the prevailing ideology has so much informed
our conceptualization of sexual interaction, it is extraordinarily difficult for
us to distinguish between assault and seduction, submission and enjoyment,

new policy, as evidenced by the Restatement’s position on silence. A consent standard
wherein a participant can infer consent from silence or from the failure to explicitly deny
consent is much more like a contractual engagement than a situation where consent is
communicated with enthusiasm and willingness. Id.
35
Ross, supra note 15, at 814.
36
CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 57–58 (1988).
37
See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 28 (1993). MacKinnon never
explicitly draws this connection, but her work has been interpreted to mean that women
cannot give true consent under the existing conditions of gender inequality. Id; see also
ANDREA DWORKIN, INTERCOURSE xxxiii (Basic Books 1997). “‘I like it’ is the standard
for citizenship, and ‘I want it’ pretty much exhausts the First Amendment’s meaning for
women.” Id.
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or so we imagine.”38 The ubiquity of male sexual dominance with romance
contributes to a sexual environment that is not easily navigable for any
sexual participant.
Overall, our culture has relied on consent standards that disserve sexual
participants in two ways: first, these standards presume both partners are
able to freely express their non-consent, and second, they infer that
women’s lack of consent does not mean no. The codification of this
dynamic should be the one receiving backlash, as it fails to create an
equitable sexual atmosphere for any party.
Perhaps in reaction to the law’s failure to recognize women’s lack of
consent in determining whether a rape has occurred, feminist activists have
promulgated the standard of “No Means No,” which has been popular on
college campuses, though it has not been effective. 39 Fraternities, in
particular, have ridiculed the standard, and sexual assault rates have been
largely stagnant despite its use. 40 Despite the mantra’s seeming failure,
college campuses host a significant amount of activism against sexual
assault.41

38
LOIS PINEAU, DATE RAPE: FEMINISM, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE LAW 6 (Leslie Francis
ed. 1996).
39
Erin Anderssen, Sex on campus: How No Means No became Yes Means Yes, THE
GLOBE AND MAIL (Nov. 14, 2014),
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/sex-on-campus-how-no-means-nobecame-yes-means-yes/article21598708/; see also Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/16/opinion/sunday/mishandlingrape.html?ref=opinion&_r=1.
40
See Rebecca Rose, Texas Tech Fraternity Stripped of Charter For ‘No Means Yes’
Sign, JEZEBEL (Oct. 7, 2014), http://jezebel.com/texas-tech-fraternity-stripped-of-charterfor-no-means-1643654682; see also Lindsay Beyerstein, “No Means Yes, Yes Means
Anal” Frat Banned From Yale, THE BIG THINK (May 18, 2011),
http://bigthink.com/focal-point/no-means-yes-yes-means-anal-frat-banned-from-yale.
41
See generally End Rape on Campus, EROC, http://endrapeoncampus.org/ (last visited
Oct. 15, 2015); see generally, KNOW YOUR IX, http://knowyourix.org/ (last visited Oct.
15, 2015).

VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 1 • 2015

197

198 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

III. CURRENT FEDERAL RESPONSES
In 1990, Congress “acted to ensure that institutions of higher education
[had] strategies to prevent and respond to sexual assault on campus and to
provide students and their parents accurate information about campus
crime.” 42 The two major federal laws dealing with sexual violence in
education are The Clery Act and Title IX.43 The Clery Act requires schools
to disclose information about crime, specifically sexual assault, on
campus.44 Title IX, as monitored by The Office for Civil Rights (OCR), is a
prohibition against sex-based discrimination in education that has been
clarified by OCR through “Dear Colleague Letters” and other guidance to
implicate sexual violence, though it is best known for mandating equal
rights within athletic programs.45
Title IX reads that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving federal financial assistance.” 46 The statute expressly prohibits
exclusion from participation in any educational program or activity and the
denial of the benefits of those programs and activities.47 It also requires that
no student be subject to discrimination under any education program or

42

HEATHER M. KARJANE ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, SEXUAL ASSAULT ON
CAMPUS: WHAT COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES ARE DOING ABOUT IT 1 (2005),
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/205521.pdf.
43
Jeanne Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (1990); Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity
in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972).
44
Jeanne Clery Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092 (1990); see also KARJANE ET AL., supra note 42.
45
Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1972);
see also Paul M. Anderson, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical Review of
Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.
325, 333 (2012).
46
Patsy Takemoto Mink Equal Opportunity in Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
(1972).
47
Id.
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activity 48 —a piece of the legislation that can be used to ensure equal
treatment of all genders in sexual misconduct investigations and hearings.
The OCR monitors Title IX enforcement using the publication of “Dear
Colleague Letters,” which act as significant guidance documents to assist
administrators in meeting their obligations by informing recipients about
how OCR evaluates compliance.49 Plus, the documents provide the public
with information about their rights and the regulations OCR enforces.50
Title IX’s broad language necessitates these letters to clarify that sexual
assault and harassment are examples of the sort of disparate treatment
experienced based on gender that triggers certain responses under Title
IX.51 To ensure notice to institutions receiving federal funding, OCR sends
these documents to the Title IX coordinator of each participating school or
institution and makes them available online through its website.52
The letters define sexual violence and schools’ responsibility to respond
to violence under Title IX.53 The letters define sexual violence as “physical
sexual acts perpetuated against a person’s will or where a person is
incapable of giving consent due to the victim’s use of drugs or alcohol.”54
Some of the listed responsibilities include the prompt, impartial, and
thorough investigations following a complaint; the commitment that the
institution keeps the complainant’s identity confidential when appropriate;
and the suspension of mediation as a remedy in sexual assault
proceedings.55 The letters make clear that if a school “knows or reasonably
48

Id.
RUSSLYNN ALI, ASSISTANT SEC’Y FOR C.R. (OCR), U. S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DEAR
COLLEAGUE: SEXUAL VIOLENCE 1, n. 1 (2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/dear_colleague_sexual_violence.pdf.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
49
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should know about student-on-student harassment that creates a hostile
environment, Title IX requires the school to take immediate action to
eliminate the harassment, prevent its recurrence, and address its effects.”56
Schools must also (1) distribute a notice of nondiscrimination to students,
parents, employees, and even applicants; (2) adopt public grievance
procedures providing for prompt and equitable resolution of student and
employee sex discrimination complaints; and (3) designate one employee
the responsibilities of coordinating Title IX complaint procedures and
addressing patterns of “systemic problems that arise during the review of
complaints.”57
The mandate that schools determine responsibility using a preponderance
of the evidence standard was the most controversial and criticized
clarification of the recent Dear Colleague Letter. OCR adopted this standard
because “the Supreme Court has applied [it] in civil litigation involving
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,” and it is the
standard OCR uses when investigating Title IX complaints against
recipients of federal education funds. 58 Despite these mandates, sexual
assault remains an immense threat on college campuses, which suggests
schools are not doing enough on their own to protect their students.

IV. THE STATE OF THE COLLEGE RAPE EPIDEMIC
“We have forgotten that before we began calling this date rape and
date fraud, we called it exciting.” 59
— Warren Farrell, men’s rights activist, author of The Myth of
Male Power
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Many reject the commonly-cited statistic that one-in-four or one-in-five
women will experience an attempted or completed sexual assault while in
college, in part because so many women choose not to view what happened
to them as rape and the population at large refuses to believe men are
committing so much rape. 60 However, statistics show that, in a given
academic year, three percent of college women experience an attempted or
completed sexual assault.61 When projected over a typical college career,
researchers estimate that one-in-five women experience sexual assault
during college.62 These statistics do not mean to suggest that one-fifth of
women believe they have been raped; rather, they are based on studies of
unreported rape, which indicate that six to 15 percent of men report acts that
meet the legal definitions of rape or attempted rape.63
Dr. David Lisak, in his study, “Repeat Rape and Multiple Offending
Among Undetected Rapists,” reports that almost two-thirds of the men
whose reported acts met the legal definition of rape raped more than once.64
These repeat rapists each committed an average of six rapes and/or
attempted rapes while in college.65 In fact, Lisak estimates that three percent
of college men are responsible for more than 90 percent of the rapes. 66
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Additionally, other research shows that, within the context of college rape,
the vast majority of survivors and perpetrators knew one another.67
Despite this problem, a national survey of 440 institutions of higher
education found that 40 percent of US colleges and universities have not
conducted a sexual assault investigation in five years, 21 percent of
campuses do not provide training on sexual violence to all faculty and staff,
and 31 percent do not provide any training to students on sexual assault
prevention or the available resources.68 Our cultural willingness to doubt
complainants, especially when a man’s reputation is on the line, promotes
this failure.
A. University Responses or Lack Thereof
Emma Sulkowicz, a Columbia University student, became a symbol of
the movement against college adjudicatory procedures in 2014 after she
began carrying her mattress around campus in a brave public protest
following the sexual misconduct hearing of her alleged rapist—a man she
knew and had a previous sexual relationship with.69 Sulkowicz, along with
23 Columbia and Barnard students, filed a Title IX complaint alleging the
schools mishandled her sexual assault case.70 Sulkowicz did not decide to
come forward with her allegation until she met two other women her
alleged rapist assaulted under similar circumstances.71
67
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During Sulkowicz’s hearing, rather than focus on when consent was
given and received, the committee hearing members were fixated on how it
was possible to be anally raped without lubricant.72 In all three women’s
hearings, the same alleged rapist was found not responsible by a
preponderance of the evidence.73 Outcomes like Sulkowicz’s contribute to
an environment that excuses sexual assault and discourages survivors from
coming forward.
Universities have ample research on the factors that inhibit their students
from reporting sexual assault. These factors include their own campus
policies on drug and alcohol; required participation in campus adjudicatory
hearings; and unintentional victim blaming through the over emphasis of
the complainant’s responsibility to avoid sexual assault, stigma, trauma, and
psychological distress.74 Partnered with all these factors is the hesitancy to
recognize these acts of violence as reportable acts of violence.75
At most universities, administers deal with reports of sexual assault
through no-contact orders or other binding administrative actions.76 Other
outcomes include expulsion, suspension, probation, censure, restitution, and
the loss of privileges—such as the ability to participate in campus
activities. 77 But the guidelines for imposing such outcomes vary widely.
Only a quarter of universities engage in information-gathering or
investigative processes, and due process for the accused is guaranteed by
fewer than 40 percent of schools with disciplinary procedures.78
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Critics of campus adjudicatory hearings, including the Supreme Court of
the United States, argue that campuses’ ability to expel students—depriving
them of property and liberty interests guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment—creates pressing due process concerns. 79 However, studies
show that colleges rarely expel the men found “responsible” for sexual
assault; 80 meanwhile, survivors often drop out of school following
inadequate responses to their allegations and have no case law or
guaranteed due process rights to fall back on.81

V. CALIFORNIA’S SENATE BILL 967 AND BACKLASH AGAINST TITLE
IX ENFORCEMENT
Senate Bill 967 was added to California’s Education Code in 2014, and it
states that “in order to receive state funds for student financial assistance,
[schools] shall adopt” an affirmative consent standard “in the determination
of whether consent was given by both parties to sexual activity” (emphasis
added).82
A. California’s Response
The bill defines affirmative consent as affirmative, conscious, and
voluntary. 83 The legislation designates the responsibility of ensuring the
receipt of affirmative consent to all participants of sexual activities.84 This
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consent cannot be inferred through the existence of a sexual relationship,
silence, lack of protest or resistance, and it can be revoked at any time.85
During disciplinary evaluations, the accused will not be excused for
mistakenly believing the complainant consented because of intoxication,
recklessness, or under circumstances where the accused knew or should
have known the complainant was unable to consent.86 All complaints will
be evaluated using a preponderance of the evidence standard.87
These standards and policies—including the rights and responsibilities
for students under the policy—will be made available for students and
addressed during incoming student orientation. 88 The outreach and
educational components of the bill seek to ensure that students will not be
surprised to learn during investigations that the question will not be “When
did you say ‘no’?” but rather “When did you say ‘yes’?” and “When did
you hear ‘yes’ from your partner?” The bill places more restrictions and
responsibilities onto schools, ensuring greater compliance with Title IX.89
B. Criticisms
In an article titled “Campus Rape: The Problem with ‘Yes Means Yes,’”
Cathy Young wrote that the bill’s effect “will be to codify vague and
capricious rules governing student conduct, to shift the burden to (usually
male) students accused of sexual offenses, and to create a disturbing
precedent for government regulation of consensual sex.” 90 Young’s
concerns seem to be based largely on what she sees as enforcing an unfair
policy against men engaged in sex.

85

Id.
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Cathy Young, Campus Rape: The Problem With ‘Yes Means Yes, TIME MAG. (Aug.
29, 2014), http://time.com/3222176/campus-rape-the-problem-with-yes-means-yes/.
86

VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 1 • 2015

205

206 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

Batya Ungar-Sargon attacks the legislation for defining silence as nonconsent in her piece titled, “‘Affirmative Consent’ Is Bad for Women:
California’s new campus rape law only codifies a troubling double
standard.” 91 Ungar-Sargon worries that the legislation immediately
redefined millions of consensual sex acts as rape.92
Since California adopted SB 967, other states and universities
implemented similar language requiring affirmative consent, intended to
keep them in adherence with Title IX’s responsibilities. 93 These
developments amplified the opposition, as more and more young men are
believed to be in danger of false accusations and wrongful findings of
responsibility. Harvard University law professors have been some of the
loudest opponents to the change. They argue that these changes give greater
power and governance to institutions that are not suited to adjudicate
crimes, like sexual assault, in the first place.94
Other concerns look to the impact that culture can have on the ways
individuals express consent. Janet Halley, writing for Harvard Law Review,
worries that adjudicators’ own experiences and biases will determine how
they view proper expressions of consent, leading to potentially classist
outcomes. 95 To illustrate her point, Halley describes the facts of State v.
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Rusk, where the white, middle-class female complainant brought charges
against a low-income white male defendant with an inner-city
background.96 The complainant testified that the accused coerced her into
sex by taking her keys and choking her. 97 Halley questions these
expressions of coercion and asks, “is entirely subjective evidence of threat
of force sufficient to establish guilt?” These sorts of ambiguities support the
argument that Title IX enforcement procedures are inherently indifferent to
“race, class, and other key differences” that may impact fair
determinations.98
Halley’s other concern is that, in “hook-up culture,” all genders are
consuming copious amounts of drugs and alcohol, but policies addressing
consent and intoxication inherently privilege the female participant at the
expense of the male. 99 She describes a sexual encounter where both the
woman and the man are voluntarily drunk during the encounter and then
afterwards feel “intense remorse and moral horror” leading them both to
turn to the Title IX office with complaints.100 She asks, “which of them gets
the benefit of the per se imputation of unwelcomeness, and which of them
carries the heavy handicap of no mitigation?”101 Her worry, of course, is
that institutions implement these policies to the detriment of men.
Halley’s concerns are valid; however, they imply colleges are not fit to
adjudicate sex crimes since it is the responsibility of the criminal justice
system. Those at The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (FIRE)
agree and argue, “Improving police response to sexual crimes is the only
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way to help victims universally.”102 Similarly, an open letter from the Rape,
Incest, and Abuse National Network (RAINN) to The White House reads,
“It would never occur to anyone to leave the adjudication of a murder in the
hands of a school’s internal judicial process. Why, then, is it not only
common, but expected, for them to do so when it comes to sexual
assault?” 103 These criticisms presume that our criminal justice system
provides the proper solution.
Reliance on the criminal justice system requires that we ask ourselves
whether incarceration works and what it would take to remove the biases
identified by Halley, regarding race and class, from criminal adjudications.
An exploration of that question is out of the scope of this paper, but
considering the wide-based failure of the criminal justice system and its
major disproportionate impact on people of color and low-income
individuals, it hardly seems like a well-thought-out solution. Additionally,
increasing police intervention ignores the fact that most assaults on college
campuses occur without witnesses and physical evidence, making it
extremely unlikely that any prosecutor would pursue the claims.

VI. WHY FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT IS THE BEST OPTION
A. The Benefits of a Universal Federal Policy
Mandating affirmative consent standards through Title IX “Dear
Colleague Letters” is the best way to ensure a universal response to campus
sexual assault because it sets a clear standard for all recipients of federal
education money. Through these clarifying letters, the federal government
has “an unprecedented platform to deliver a national message of zero
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tolerance for sexual violence on college campuses.” 104 Data on campus
sexual assault and the sheer number of Title IX investigations shows that
states are not taking action on their own to address issues of non-consent
and are only passively trying to adhere to Title IX’s obligations. Federal
enforcement is the only way to ensure universal equal rights on all college
campuses.
Next, much of the backlash against affirmative consent standards
suggests a certain amount of anxiety resulting from what critics see as an
ambiguous standard subject to misinterpretation and accidental rape. This
anxiety is the best argument for the institution of a national standard
because universalizing investigative procedures will reduce ambiguity in
sexual communication. OCR could mandate affirmative consent policies in
the same way that it enforced a universal adoption of the preponderance of
the evidence standard.
Currently, the policy guidelines around consent “leave schools with wide
latitude in developing and implementing grievance procedures. Having
promulgated a flexible compliance standard, OCR naturally investigates the
worst actors and rarely examines ineffective, but non-egregious, sexual
harassment policies.” 105 A stricter standard on consent would give the
federal government greater enforcement power, which is beneficial—
despite federalist concerns—because the existing framework puts the
burden on individual litigants to ensure schools resolve complaints
properly, 106 and this dynamic contributes to a legal system that is only
available to those with the means to afford it.
Additionally, a national standard is most likely to result in a paradigm
shift regarding consent in general, outside of adjudicative and criminal
proceedings. California SB 967 is a great example of how the federal
104

Id.
Walker, supra note 6, at 99–100.
106
Id.
105

VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 1 • 2015

209

210 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

government can clarify Title IX requirements to better respond to the
campus rape epidemic.
Finally, many have criticized California since the promulgation of SB
967 for seeking to legislate sexuality by mandating that sexual partners
adopt a specific style of consent.107 However, consent is both a legal and a
sexual policy, given the fact that the lack of consent is what distinguishes
sexual conduct from sexual assault. For these reasons, the law can help
address sexual assault because it applies uniformly, has standards of review,
and proscribes normative behavior to ensure that individuals know when
they are breaking the law. Furthermore, sexual assault is a criminal act and
should be addressed by the law to illustrate the seriousness of a sexual
assault violation.
B. A Better Alternative to the Criminal Justice System
Although sexual assault is a criminal act, SB 967 does not advocate for a
greater intervention from the criminal justice system. In fact, the statute
prescribes standards for university misconduct proceedings that distinguish
it from the court of law in an intentional and beneficial way. Though many
people argue that a university is not the place to determine quasi-criminal
liability, deferring to the criminal justice system only serves to promote a
different kind of violence and injustice. Currently, the United States has the
largest incarcerated population in the world, with over 2.2 million people in
the nation’s prisons, plus countless more who are still under community
custody or reeling from the effects of a guilty verdict.108 The United States’
criminal justice system produced a 500 percent increase in its incarcerated
population in the last 30 years, despite evidence that incarceration is not the
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best means to achieve public safety. 109 California’s policy emphasizes
communication and education to reduce contact with the criminal justice
system while adequately responding to sexual assault violations with the
seriousness those violations deserve.
Furthermore, college adjudicatory proceedings differ from criminal trials
in another significant way. In a criminal trial, the state brings charges
against the accused and defends its own interests; it does not advocate on
behalf of the survivor. This procedure means that the needs of the survivor
are secondary or ignored altogether. Schools are equipped to focus on the
needs of the survivor, including academic accommodations, dorm and class
transfers, and mental health support.110 Tantamount to all these benefits is
the fact that schools are in a position to respond more quickly than our overburdened criminal justice system. 111 Attorney Nancy Chi Cantalupo, an
expert on Title IX, spoke to this benefit:
For student survivors of sexual assault, Title IX creates rights that
do not exist in criminal law. The statute recognizes that students
struggling to heal from sexual trauma often have greater difficulty
succeeding in school. Sexual trauma commonly causes serious
health consequences that lead to drops in grades, withdrawal from
classes, transfers to less desirable schools and even dropping out.
These consequences deny victims equal educational opportunity.
In contrast, criminal laws cannot protect students from gender
inequality and provide crime victims with few rights. Prosecutors
do not represent victims, so victims have no right to confidentiality
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or privacy. Prosecutors’ wide discretion empowers them to
shortchange victims’ interests for their own priorities.112
The small percentage of men who rape, relative to the number of sexual
assaults occurring on college campuses, lends further support to an
affirmative consent standard. Critics of the affirmative consent standard
worry that it will cause men to accidently rape more women, but the
standard will likely give more women the framework to understand their
experiences as reportable, 113 and theoretically allow those who are
completing the majority of sexual assaults to be identified.
C. How “No Means No” Fails Sexual Participants and “Yes Means Yes”
Does Not
Despite concerns regarding men’s inability to get affirmative consent,
current standards relying on the subjective readings of ambiguous indicators
of consent are far more dangerous for all people engaging in partnered sex.
These criterions contribute to difficult standards of consent for women and
also do no favors for men, who are the presumed initiators of sex. Under
these standards, men learn that the absence of “no” operates as “yes.”
Critics of SB 967 worry that the shift from “No Means No” to “Yes
Means Yes” will cause the young men of America to accidently rape
women and ruin their lives over a miscommunication during what was, to
them, consensual sex. Laura Dunn, executive director of SurvJustice,
describes how “No Means No” was a failed standard, causing more
ambiguity than the affirmative consent standard:
We only talked about what consent was not, which is not a very
helpful paradigm. From the victim’s side, it says we have to resist.
But even looking at this from the perspective of [the accused], the
112
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traditional definition is telling them that it’s O.K. to do this until
the victim says ‘no.’ That’s not really a helpful definition for them
either because it can really be too late at that point. With
affirmative consent, it’s simple. Consent is consent.114
Conversely, under the traditional “No Means No” policies, the
investigator would ask the complainant when she said no to sex, and if she
failed to say no, then the investigator could assume the accused had no
ability to know that the complainant was not interested in continuing with
sexual activity. Under the new policy, rapists do not receive the license to
presume consent when they have no reason to believe they received it.
The bill makes clear that affirmative consent is not a requirement to
engage in sexual activity, but a required lens through which allegations are
evaluated. 115 Nothing in the statute prevents two or more people from
agreeing to practice a different style of consent, but rapists ought to be wary
that their failure to practice any consent will be scrutinized by the
university’s misconduct board, as opposed to past procedures that
scrutinized the complainant’s failure to say no.
D. The Inherent Equity in Affirmative Policies
This move promotes equity by changing the standards of consent to
recognize the power imbalances that have been practiced throughout the
history of rape law in the United States. We know that past practices—
where complainants are expected to voice non-consent through force and
resistance—do not accurately reflect how most women respond to sexual
assault.116 In the past, allegations of sexual assault could be set aside after
114
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the accused showed that the complainant did not say “no.”117 Those legal
standards inevitably promote rape by giving complainants the responsibility
to prevent their own assaults, as opposed to placing the responsibility of
positive and enthusiastic consent on all parties.
Conversely, an affirmative consent standard asks all participants when
they received consent, instead of asking the survivor how she resisted.
Furthermore, the adoption of affirmative consent standards may encourage
survivors to come forward because of the requirement that the accused
show he sought and received consent. This change “straightforwardly
eliminates a primary reason that sexual assault goes unreported: that the
[survivor’s] credibility is questioned in the absence of visible cuts or
bruises.” 118 Overall, the new standard promotes equity by abandoning
offensive assumptions about how people express and receive consent.
In Nicholas J. Little's law review article promoting the affirmative
consent standard's adoption in criminal trials, he explains that the standard
would only prevent silence from operating as consent. He writes,
Simply moving to an affirmative consent standard does not prevent
the accused from claiming that he asked permission and the
woman gave it to him. It is not, as some have suggested, a
requirement that men carry permission slips that must be signed by
the woman before sex. Instead, it holds that a man cannot take a
woman's silence as indicative of a willingness to engage in sexual
orientation.119
In the case of university adjudicatory hearings, the university will still
have to find that the complainant did not give consent, which includes
verbal and non-verbal expressions of consent.
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Arguments opposing affirmative consent standards fail because they rest
on the criticism that privileging affirmative consent codifies an ambiguous
standard that makes it difficult for men to know when they are raping
someone and when they are having consensual and enthusiastic sex. This
reasoning has two major flaws. First, it presumes that men are stupid and
cannot tell the difference between rape and sex until their sex partner begins
fighting for her life. This presumption is entirely offensive to all men.
Second, the opposition to affirmative consent implies that a standard
focusing on resistance and non-consent is less ambiguous. Because we
know women respond to rape differently, 120 a standard that seeks out a
positive or affirmative expression of sexual enthusiasm is inherently less
ambiguous.
This clarity assists people engaging in sex understand what does and does
not qualify as consent (e.g., “yes” means “yes,” while the absence of “yes”
or another enthusiastic and positive expression of consent means “no”).
Similarly, clearer lines will improve determinations of responsibility by
preventing bias and gender stereotypes from predominating administrators’
decisions. The federal government’s promulgation of less ambiguous
framework will help university administrators know when their
investigations—or lack thereof—place them in violation of Title IX. A
potential violation of Title IX, and the dependent suspension of federal
funding, will likely prevent universities from engaging in silencing and
inadequate investigatory behaviors and lead to more consistent and fair
outcomes.
Lastly, the growing precision of Title IX’s application to athletic
programs suggests it will be equally successful in remedying problems
related to sexual violence. To enforce the athletic nature of Title IX,
Congress passed the Javits Amendment, which required the Department of
120
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Health, Education, and Welfare to prepare “proposed regulations
implementing the provisions of [Title IX] relating to the prohibition of sex
discrimination in federally assisted education programs which shall include
. . . reasonable provisions considering the nature of particular sports.”121
Several guidance letters and the Civil Rights Restoration Act made it clear
that “Title IX compliance is institution-wide, which means it is not focused
on only a specific program or activity that receives federal financial
assistance.”122 The success of Title IX in making intercollegiate athletics
more equitable among sexes shows how clarification and scope of federal
enforcement can create national and lasting changes to an institution.

VII. ADDRESSING DUE PROCESS AND STANDARDS OF PROOF
CONCERNS
Reading the criticisms of affirmative consent policies can be frustrating
because many of the writers misunderstand the policy to be one that
legislates sexual behavior; however, many critics have been smart to
recognize the potential due process concerns alive in this debate. This
section will walk through the due process concerns and focus specifically
on standards of proof the accused must meet.
A. A General Overview of Due Process in Education
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, primary
and secondary public school students have both a property and liberty
interest in their education.123 The Supreme Court held in Goss v. Lopez that
121
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public school students from kindergarten through high school face the
deprivation of a liberty interest during school disciplinary proceedings and
hearings because those findings could damage their reputations among
peers, teachers, and future employers.124 However, it is not clear whether
this holding translates to public universities and colleges, where students’
attendance is not mandatory, nor are they entitled to admission.
Some lower courts have extended Goss’ protections to students of public
colleges and universities.125 In Gaspar v. Burton, for example, a nursing
student brought an action for wrongful dismissal following a determination
of poor academic performance at a public vocational-technical college.126
The Tenth Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals found that the
plaintiff had a property interest in her education after paying a “specific,
separate fee for enrollment and attendance.” 127 The court deferred to the
university’s judgment because academic proceedings exercise a quasijudicial function and, therefore, “their decisions are conclusive, providing
that their action has been in good faith and not arbitrary.”128 The court held
further that schools only need to make the student aware prior to
termination of that student’s “failure or impending failure to meet [the
school’s academic] standards” to satisfy due process. 129 The holding in
Gaspar suggests that universities have broad discretion to remove students
124
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for subjective cause; however, the criminal nature of sexual assault
allegations complicates this dynamic because of the stigma associated with
a finding of responsibility.
B. Stigma and Fair Standards of Proof
Given the inherent stigma of criminal behavior, some courts mandate a
higher standard of review for campus violations that are also criminal
violations. For example, in Smyth v. Lubbers, students were suspended from
their state university after a college official found marijuana in their dorm
room.130 The students argued that the search was unlawful, that it violated
their Fourth Amendment rights of privacy, and that the disciplinary
proceeding’s “substantial evidence” standard of proof violated their due
process rights.131 The district court held that, where a student is charged
under college regulations with an act that is also criminal, “substantial
evidence” is an inadequate standard of proof and that “any standard lower
than a ‘preponderance of the evidence’ would have the effect of requiring
the accused to prove his innocence . . . it would be fundamentally unfair to
shift the burden of proof to the accused.” 132 The court encouraged
universities to at least adopt a preponderance standard in future
determinations because of the serious consequences of allegations that are
also criminal.133 This holding, in some measure, supports the contention that
the preponderance of the evidence standard would not shift the burden of
proof to students who are accused of sexual assault, as many critics
prophesize.
The OCR mandated the preponderance standard through a “Dear
Colleague Letter,” so even schools that have not instituted an affirmative
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consent policy are still required to make determinations under the
standard.134 In response to the letter’s policy, Lavinia M. Weizel applied the
Supreme Court’s procedural due process balancing test from Mathews v.
Eldridge to determine whether the preponderance standard jeopardizes the
rights of accused students.135 Matthews held that due process is a flexible
standard to be construed based on the demands of a particular situation.136
In Matthews, the majority opinion held that due process generally
requires the consideration of three distinct factors:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail.137
As to the first factor, the property interest in one’s education and the
liberty interest in one’s reputation are the private interests affected by
university misconduct proceedings, specifically as they relate to future
educational and employment opportunities.138 For the second, no data on
false findings of responsibility under a preponderance standard exists, but
plenty of solutions exist to safeguard against this risk. These solutions
include the right to counsel; the right to cross-examine the witnesses against
the accused; the right to a public hearing; a list of the witnesses the
university intends to call; and recusal of hearing committee members with
134
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familiarity with the accused, the complainant, or the conduct involved.139
Neither the preponderance of the evidence standard nor an affirmative
consent standard deny the student any of the above protections, as they are
still available for any university to adopt under Title IX’s guidelines.
The third factor is the government’s interest or the school’s interest.
Universities have a massive interest in creating disciplinary proceedings
that are fair to both parties because of the high rate of sexual assault and the
difficulty complainants and survivors have in gaining a resolution that
ensures the equal educational atmosphere Title IX guarantees.140 American
rape law’s influence on the public’s willingness to disbelieve the
complainant is the primary complication of the preponderance of the
evidence standard, and is something that the affirmative consent standard
will need to confront.
Will Creely, writing for FIRE, worries that the preponderance standard
will afford the accused “the scant protection of our judiciary’s least certain
standard . . . [where] the burden of proof can be satisfied by little more than
a hunch.”141 Creely’s premises his position on the idea that allegations of
rape within college campuses are stigmatized, treated, and viewed with
equal footing to those in criminal settings, but anecdotes from rape
survivors suggest that this assumption is bore more out of hysteria than
reality. 142 Even before OCR mandated the preponderance standard, more
than 80 percent of schools had already adopted it voluntarily.143 The use of
139
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a preponderance standard, without more survivor-centered policies like an
affirmative consent standard and bystander trainings, do little to protect
survivors of sexual assault.
Joe Cohn, the legislative policy director of FIRE, argues that the adoption
of affirmative consent standards will “undermine trust and the integrity and
reliability of campus judiciaries.” 144 But stories like Emma Sulkowicz’s
show that, before affirmative consent was even a national hot topic, students
were unable to trust in their campus disciplinary hearings.145
C. Should Survivors Have Due Process Rights?
The narrative that promotes disbelieving complainants in favor of
protecting the accused’s future invalidates the survivors’ experiences, which
often consists of a negative impact to their reputation and educational and
future employment opportunities. 146 Despite consistent findings that the
lack of institutional support following a sexual assault causes students to
miss or fail classes, complainants have no due process rights in these
proceedings.
A student challenged her university’s violation of her due process rights
in Theriault v. University of Southern Maine, where the faulty disciplinary
proceeding against her alleged assailant caused harm to her education and
emotional well-being.147 The court found that her
property interest in a public education was not at issue in the
Committee hearing and any alleged loss of educational opportunity
was due to her subjective response to the outcome of the hearing,

144

Natalie Kitroeff, More States Tell College Students to Say Yes Before Sex,
BLOOMBERG BUS. WEEK (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/201411-24/new-jersey-colleges-may-make-students-explicitly-consent-to-sex.
145
Grigoriadis, supra note 69.
146
Id.
147
Theriault v. Univ. of S. Me., 353 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D. Me. 2004).

VOLUME 14 • ISSUE 1 • 2015

221

222 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

the ‘attendant emotional anguish’ . . . was not imposed by any of
the defendants, nor could it have been.148
This case is used to support the conclusion that college misconduct hearings
do not affect complainants’ liberty and property interests.
Theriault states that a charge concerning a complainant’s reputation
following a disciplinary hearing would need to implicate an underlying
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, like the vested property
interest discussed in Gaspar.149 For students who experience sexual assault,
the damage to their reputation does not give rise to a claim without a
university action infringing on their interest in education, since the
university does not pursue their expulsion or suspension following an
allegation.
This nuance concerning action and inaction is primarily semantic.
Although the adjudicatory board does not decide to push the complainant
out of school, suspend her from classes, or subject her to public humiliation
following its determination, those consequences follow directly from a
culture that fails to hold men accountable for sexual assault on college
campuses. A campus culture that sustains and perpetuates a victim-blaming
mentality delivers an inadvertent response to the complainant following an
adjudicatory hearing that forces many of the proposed sanctions and
punishments available to the accused onto the complainant. This dynamic is
concerning because the inadvertency of these sanctions allows campus
administrators to view the treatment as self-imposed.
The standards used to decide these issues cannot be found in
administrative and misconduct polices—they are the result of a culture that
is willing to excuse rapists because of miscommunication, a culture of binge
drinking, or the distractions of pretty girls. Though largely a cultural issue,
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these assumptions and stereotypes have been codified and perpetuated
through American rape law for years and now inform college adjudicatory
proceedings. Stories like Emma Sulkowicz’s support the need for national
affirmative consent policy because university sexual misconduct policies do
not just need a few revisions, they need a complete overhaul to adequately
respond to the problem. Affirmative consent policies make this shift
possible.
D. When to Share the Risk of Error
Given the harms to both the accused and the accuser’s reputation,
educational opportunities, and success following sexual assault, the
preponderance of the evidence standard is the most equitable standard of
proof. The lower standard is further supported by the fact that complainants
are not guaranteed any due process should they experience injury to either
liberty or property interests related to their educations.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Addington v. Texas,
discussed the differences between the preponderance of the evidence and
clear and convincing standards in a way that is helpful for settling this
debate. 150 Addington decided the standard of proof necessary for the
involuntary commitment of individuals with mental illness. 151 The Court
found that the individual’s liberty interest in the outcome of a civil
commitment hearing was much greater than the state’s interest in providing
care to its citizens who are unable to care for themselves and in protecting
the community from those individuals with violent tendencies.152 The Court
said that the “standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the
litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate
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decision.”153 The use of a preponderance of the evidence standard allows
litigants to “share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion,” which is an
inappropriate standard when deciding whether to commit an individual with
mental illness against his will.154
Universities further their interests in student safety and gender equality in
educational access by using a preponderance of the evidence standard.
Though, by its very nature, it could increase the risk of erroneous
determinations, using the standard sends the message to the student body
that the university is serious about supporting those who are sexually
assaulted and holding accountable those who perpetuate those assaults. A
policy using a “clear and convincing evidence” sets too high a standard
based on the minimal risk to the accused’s freedom.
The clear and convincing evidence standard is used in involuntary civil
commitment cases, permanent termination of parental rights proceedings,
and denaturalization determinations. 155 In all of these determinations,
individuals are at risk of losing their freedom, their ability to parent their
children, or the right to remain in the United States, respectively. Surely
those losses are not comparable to a punishment that requires an individual
to take Biology 101 next semester so as to avoid the woman he raped.
Because universities so rarely impose suspensions after misconduct
hearings, it is more helpful to compare determinations that currently use the
“clear and convincing evidence” standard with more commonly used
punishments, such as no-contact orders and sexual assault bystander
trainings. 156 Taking actually imposed punishments into account further
153
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illustrates how absurd the use of the clear and convincing evidence standard
would be in college adjudicatory hearings.
While the preponderance of the evidence standard does not shift the
burden of proof to the accused, many argue that coupling it with the
affirmative consent standard will unfairly shift the burden of proof.
However, in sexual assault proceedings, it is the accused who raises consent
as a defense. 157 In criminal proceedings, the defense that the sex was
consensual is the most difficult defense for prosecutors to defeat.158 When a
complaint is brought, the accused will raise consent as a defense and argue
that he, in fact, had consensual sex with the complainant.
The affirmative consent standard merely asks the accused to describe
when he received consent at each point of the sexual encounter. This way,
the complainant’s non-consent does not become the focus of the
determination. 159 This definition of consent dissuades decision-making
bodies from using the resistance and implied consent standards that have
privileged rapists in the past. Additionally, it requires individuals to ensure
an express agreement through words or actions before engaging in sexual
contact, which raises the standard of sexual responsibility for all
participants.160

VIII. CONCLUSION
The topic of sexual assault, especially when the needs of perpetrators
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depressing and tiresome topic. On the bright side, affirmative consent
policies have really taken off since California passed SB 967. California
already extended its “Yes Means Yes” policy to high school, and New York
adopted an affirmative consent policy like California’s SB 967 in July. 161
While defending the proposed bill in New Jersey, Democratic Senator
Jim Beach said, “It will create a more supportive environment and get rid of
the notion that victims must have verbally protested or physically resisted in
order to have suffered from a sexual assault.” 162 Beach’s statement
highlights the standard’s potential cultural impact as the strongest reason for
the language’s adoption, as opposed to making it easier to vilify rapists.
Despite the fact that legislators adopt affirmative consent policies in an
effort to create safer spaces for women on college campuses, the
conversation always turns to men, as if they have been forgotten. What
people really forget is how central men’s autonomy has been to previous
strategies to prevent rape. Consider rape whistles. They are not made for
men to blow right before they consider raping someone; they are for women
to use to notify people in the area that she is in danger. They are an example
of how we have made it women’s responsibility to avoid rape. This
approach does not work.
In looking at college campuses, many blame the excessive number of
sexual assaults on binge drinking. Jaclyn Friedman, the creator of the “Yes
Means Yes” mantra, points out that the “unregulated party scene” is only a
risk for half the population; being a woman is a risk factor for rape.163 The
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problem is not drinking too much, short skirts, or fraternities—the problem
is sexual misconduct policies that make the complainant’s consent suspect.
Institutions of higher education, however, do not have stare decisis
keeping them from responding quickly, appropriately, and intelligently to
the sexual assault of women across the United States, and the federal
government can accelerate the adoption of these policies through Title IX.
The argument that affirmative consent standards will turn good men into
rapists should offend all people, but particularly those who identify as men.
In defending men from offensive rape narratives, Jill Filipovic writes, “Men
are rational human beings fully capable of listening to their partners and
understanding that sex isn’t about pushing someone to do something they
don’t want to do. Plenty of men are able to grasp the idea that sex should be
entered into joyfully and enthusiastically by both partners.”164 Affirmative
consent is not scary. It is a necessary step our communities should welcome
as we respond to years of allowing the absence of “no” to function as “yes.”
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